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Lenin’s Imperialism nearly 100 years on: an outdated paradigm? 
Abstract: Lenin’s Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism formed part of the canon of 
mainstream Marxist writing for much of the twentieth century, and also represented a critical 
reference point for Marxist attempts to interpret international relations for much of the same period. 
At one and the same time both a stinging condemnation of the betrayal of the European working 
class by their political leaders in 1914, and a synthesis, with some original elements, of existing 
contemporary Marxist theory on imperialism, Lenin’s ‘popular outline’ subsequently (from around 
the time of the ‘New Left’ onwards) came under increasing fire for being both incoherent, irrelevant, 
and overrated. This article revisits both the contemporary genesis of the text, and the question of its 
longer term pertinence and relevance in the light of capitalism’s current crisis. 
 
Keywords: Lenin, Bukharin, Hilferding, imperialism, war, capitalism, landgrabbing, arms race, World 
War One, oligarchs, crisis theory 
In 1916, during the height of the First World War, V.I. Lenin in Zurich wrote Imperialism The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism. Placed near the centre of Soviet foreign policy for much of the Cold War, 
particularly under Stalinism, the pamphlet has also since gone on to be reassessed several times by 
those on the left. As early as 1962, International socialist leader Michael Kidron wryly remarked that 
‘fate was unkind’ to have singled out Lenin’s Imperialism as the ‘most pervasive’ of his writings, given 
the extent to which it no longer fitted the facts of how the world had actually evolved. Such 
criticisms were repeated from different perspectives by others-for example by Giovanni Arrighi, or by 
Charles W. Lindsey in 1982. By 1990, one leading academic study of all existing Marxist theories of 
imperialism concluded that, in retrospect, ‘Lenin’s pamphlet has been treated with a reverence it 
does not deserve.’1 The new consensus on this, one of Lenin’s undoubted key texts, appears to have 
become that what was original in Lenin’s writing was either not clear, was underdeveloped at the 
time, or was open to misinterpretation; and moreover that what was clear was not original, being no 
more than a digest of Bukharin or Hilferding’s writings.  
More recently as well, efforts have been made to revisit  Marxist theories of imperialism in 
general, efforts which to a greater or lesser degree endeavour to revise or overthrow the 
suppositions contained in the texts of Marxism’s ‘Golden Age’, of which Lenin’s work is undoubtedly 
one.2 In light of these growing challenges to this once-orthodox text, this article seeks to explore and 
revisit both the influences that helped shape Lenin’s original pamphlet, the actual content of the 
work itself, and the question of its legacy and longer term relevance. In doing so, I will by proxy also 
explore the debate around imperialism within European social-democracy in general at the time, an 
area recently covered in Richard B. Day and Daniel Gaido’s excellent edited collection Discovering 
                                                          
1 Michael Kidron, ‘Imperialism-Highest Stage but One.’ International Socialism  N.9 Summer 1962, available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/kidron/works/1962/xx/imperial.htm Charles  W. Lindsey, ‘Lenin’s Theory 
of Imperialism.’ Review of Radical Political Economics 14:1 (1982), pp.1-9,  Anthony Brewer, Marxist 
Theories of Imperialism. A Critical Survey. Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1990), p.21. 
2 See for example: David Harvey, The New Imperialism. (Oxford: 2003), Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global 
Political Economy. (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), M. Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire. (Cambridge, MA: 2000). 
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Imperialism, and also the eternally vexed and relevant question of where the concept of imperialism 
fits more generally within a Marxist theory of crisis, given the absence within Marx’s own work of the 
once-promised book on the ‘world market’.3 In my conclusions I endeavour to argue that aspects of 
imperialism noted by Lenin in his own day at the empirical level are in fact being revived in some 
regards, though in different shapes and forms; whilst on the other hand the arguments often made 
against Lenin are not necessarily always as strong as they first appear. 
The Text in Context 
There are generally taken to be three classical direct influences on Lenin’s own work of 1916-
J.A. Hobson’s 1902 text Imperialism, Rudolf Hilferding’s 1910 work Finance Capital, and Bukharin’s 
1915 text Imperialism and World Economy, which Lenin read in its draft format, and for which he 
wrote the foreword. However it is also clear from volume 39 of Lenin’s collected works, which 
collates Lenin’s notebooks compiled for the writing of imperialism, that executing the study involved 
a considerable degree of additional independent research by Lenin as well, not least into the 
statistical handbooks of the day and the contemporary press (including, from the British side, The 
Daily Telegraph and The Economist).4 The 21 notebooks on the topic of imperialism alone assembled 
in the collected works edition run to some 728 pages, not counting the assorted miscellaneous notes 
from the period between 1912 and 1916 at the back of the same edition, or additional materials 
available only in the Leninskii Sbornik. Furthermore, it is clear that the sub-text behind the whole 
work, which was obviously not present in Hobson or Hilferding’s efforts, was Lenin’s ongoing 
revulsion at the betrayal of Kautsky and the German SPD in general in signing through war credits in 
1914.  
For Lenin, as for many others in the socialist movement at the time, the questions of 
imperialism and revisionism were therefore deeply intertwined; the fact that Eduard Bernstein was 
one of the earliest defenders within the pre-war SPD of the so-called ‘progressive’ role of imperialism 
tallied exactly, and was in Lenin’s eyes of a piece, with his ‘revisionist’ heresy arguing for the 
parliamentary road to socialism.5 What was particularly repellent for Lenin of course was the gradual 
movement of Kautsky himself towards Bernstein’s own positions after 1908. Bernstein in 1907 had 
already argued with Kautsky that colonialism merely reflected ‘the right of peoples with a higher 
                                                          
3 On Marx's original plan, see: Roman Rosdolsky, The Making of Marx's 'Capital'. Volume 1 (Eastbourne: Pluto 
Press, 1968/77), chapter 2. 
4 On the press, see for example: V.I . Lenin, 'Notebooks on Imperialism.' Collected Works 39, (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1968), pp.277-8. 
5  That Lenin drew a direct line between Kautsky’s concept of ‘ultra-imperialism’ and the emergence of 
revisionism (‘economism’), beginning with Bernstein in the 1890s, is one of the main points made in his 
introduction to Bukharin’s work. Bukharin equally rejected Kautsky’s ultra-imperialism thesis but, as we 
shall see, from slightly different premises than Lenin’s. See: Nikolai Bukharin, Imperialism and World 
Economy. (London: Bookmarks Publications, 2003), pp.11-12, 145-53. 
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culture over those with a lower culture’, and would have to be accepted as a fait accompli by all 
socialists.6 The text of Kautsky’s with which Bernstein took issue in expressing this critique however, 
had itself already seen Kautsky himself retreat from endorsing colonial rebellion as a futile 
endeavour, one to be avoided just as much as ‘pointless proletarian putsches in Europe itself.’7 By 
1912 Kautsky had then already moved further towards a merger with Bernstein, in suggesting that 
existing class differences and economic conflicts could be managed via a parliamentary route, one 
both embracing disarmament, and advancing the creation of a ‘United States of Europe.’ This new 
position, which by 1914 Kautsky came to term ‘ultra-imperialism’, argued that ‘the competitive battle 
between states will be neutralised by their cartel-relationship’-in effect, a peaceful (re)division of the 
world.8 For this very reason Lenin in 1916 underlined that his pamphlet, for its part, would devote 
specific attention to criticizing ‘Kautskyism’- ‘the more so since pacifism and “democracy” in general, 
which have no claim to Marxism whatever…are obscuring the profundity of the contradictions of 
imperialism and the inevitable revolutionary crisis to which it gives rise…’9 
Beyond being a weapon in his ongoing struggle with Kautsky and revisionism in general 
within the European Social-Democratic movement, it is clear that Lenin also used the pamphlet to 
work through his own ideas regarding the particular nature of the capitalist crisis which was then 
manifesting itself during the First World War. Here, it is interesting to compare Lenin’s method of 
analysis with both Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg’s on the one hand, and Bukharin’s on the other. It 
is clear that Lenin’s own analysis of capitalist crisis was deeply influenced by Hilferding, and belongs 
to the so-called ‘disproportionality’ school; not until the 1930s, in fact, would theses around the 
‘falling rate of profit’ begin to become influential in Marxist analyses of capitalist crisis. Hilferding's 
Finance Capital, unjustly neglected and often forgotten today, had earned near-universal praise upon 
its first publication in 1910, with many seeing it at the time as the most important Marxist work since 
Marx's own Capital. Lenin was amongst the book's earliest admirers, though he remained critical of 
those aspects of the work which in his eyes appeared to lead towards opportunism, and to a belief, 
for example, that the era of financial speculation was nearing its end.10  
                                                          
6  Richard B. Day & Daniel Gaido, (eds.), Discovering Imperialism. Social democracy to World War 1. Chicago: 
Haymarket Press, 2011, p.41 
7  Ibid. 
8 Ibid., p.66. 
9  V. I. Lenin, Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism. A Popular Outline. (New York: International 
Publishers, 1939), p.12 
10  Hilferding's eventual personal embrace of, and belief in, parliamentary politics as the best means of 
securing socialism had well-known painful personal as well as political repercussions later on, during the 
inter-war period. An active SPD participant in the Reichstag, Hilferding rose to actually become head of the 
Finance Ministry before a clash with the man who became Hitler's favoured economic adviser, Hjalmar 
Schacht, eventually forced him to resign in 1929. When the Nazis themselves seized power in 1933, 
Hilferding remained convinced that they would only be able to hold onto office for six to eight weeks. 
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Given the influence of Hilferding on Lenin’s text, there remains nonetheless a strange but 
persistent tradition of interpreting Lenin’s own exposition as representing an ‘underconsumptionist’ 
analysis.11 Lenin’s earliest writings on political economy (in intellectual combat with the Russian 
narodnik movement) had explicitly dismissed ‘underconsumption’ as the source of capitalist crises 
(as indeed, in Volume 2 of Capital, Marx had)12, and he similarly steered clear of Rosa Luxemburg’s 
assumption (in her 1912 work The Accumulation of Capital) that imperialism arose as a result of a 
‘chronic problem with markets’, entailing an inevitable eventual capitalist breakdown (the so-called 
zusammenbruch school). Lenin by contrast would later pointedly warn the Comintern never to count 
upon such a breakdown, since there was no such thing as an ‘absolutely hopeless situation’ for 
capitalism.13 His own most famous private comments on Luxemburg’s work, to Kamenev in 1912, 
were that ‘she has got into a shocking muddle. She has distorted Marx.’14 Following Hilferding 
relatively closely, Lenin in his 1916 text therefore traces both the absolute transformation in the 
nature of capital since Marx’s day-the transition from ‘the domination of capital in general to the 
domination of finance capital’-and the corresponding problem of uneven development. In critiquing 
Luxemburg’s argument that imperialism and ultimate capitalist breakdown resulted from 
competition over the third parties necessary for expanded reproduction to occur, Lenin -in his private 
notes on her text -had earlier remarked that ‘The development of capital goes sometimes in breadth 
(foreign countries), sometimes in depth.’15 Luxemburg's concept of capitalist breakdown in short 
depended upon a mechanical mathematical repetition of Marx's own (intentionally abstract) 
reproduction schemes, not least upon a regular fixed renewal of worn-out capital stock (a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hitler's consolidation of power instead forced Hilferding himself, as both a prominent socialist and a Jew, to 
flee Germany, and he eventually met his death after being handed over to the Gestapo by the Vichy 
authorities in 1941. 
11 See for example: Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, pp.118-19, Callinicos, Imperialism and Global 
Political Economy, pp.47, 52. 
12  The contradiction between socialization of production and the private individual character of appropriation 
was highlighted by Lenin as the specific cause of crises under capitalism, whereas '...underconsumption (to 
which crises are allegedly due) existed under the most diverse economic systems...' Lenin, 'A 
Characterization of Economic Romanticism.' (1897) Collected Works Volume 2, Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1972, p.167.  
13  V. I. Lenin, ‘The Second Congress of the Communist International’ July 19-August 7 1920, Collected Works, 
31, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965, p.227. 
14  V. I. Lenin, letter to L.B. Kamenev, 1913, Collected Works, 35, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976, pp.93-4. 
15  Lenin, Imperialism, p.46,  ‘Zamechaniia V. I. Lenina po povodu knigi R. Liuksemburg “Nakoplenie Kapitala”’, 
Leninskii Sbornik, XXII, Moscow: Partiinoe Izdatel’stvo, 1933, p.388. For one of the latest restatements of 
Marxist critique regarding Luxemburg's conclusions, see the appendix to Richard B. Day & Daniel Gaido, 
(eds.), Discovering Imperialism.  
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depreciation account). Such a method which was inherently artificial and unrepresentative of Marx's 
own intentions in developing the model. Lenin's identification of disproportionality as, by contrast, 
the major factor in Marx's theory of capitalist crisis was explored at greater length in his 1916 text, 
which underlined that even from a purely geographical perspective, ‘the unevenness in the rate of 
expansion of colonial possessions is very marked’.16  
Lenin’s own analysis 
The first consequence of this system of growing monopoly by finance capital which 
facilitated imperialism, and in which more and more companies became subsidiaries owned by 
financial oligarchs and cartels, was a phenomenon which Lenin noted even the ‘bourgeois’ press of 
the day picked up on-the capacity to cheat, to conceal losses, to pull the wool over the eyes of 
shareholders, to engage in riskier forms of speculation, to socialize losses and privatize profits.17 The 
growth of monopoly cartels was also noted by Hilferding to be generated by the capitalist business 
cycle itself; monopolies being better able to manage fluctuations in the rate of profit, as well as the 
growth of fixed capital requirements for expanded reproduction to occur, the ultimate outcome was 
a growing tendency towards the creation of a system designed around money yielding money (M-
M').18 The second consequence followed from the first, namely both increasingly disproportionate 
profits, and increasingly catastrophic losses during periods when both sources of credit shrank 
(usually after initial dramatic expansion) and exchange values became rebalanced again against the 
actual law of value. Lenin noted that the main contradiction here remained the ever-increasing 
socialization of the means of production, but the retention of the increased profits so acquired by a 
narrow group of speculators and shareholders. The consequence was, in Lenin's view, in fact an 
increase in disproportionality: 
 '..it [monopoly] increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent 
 in capitalist production as a whole. The disparity between the 
 development of agriculture and that of industry, which is  
characteristic of capitalism, is increased.'19  
The reference here to agriculture is significant, as we shall see later on, and forms part of the specific 
of Lenin’s own analysis, Lenin having studied the agricultural question in Russia itself to probably 
greater depth than any other contemporary Russian Social-Democrat, whilst also being a student of 
                                                          
16  Lenin, Imperialism, p.80. 
17 Ibid., pp.48-50. 
18  Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital. A study of the latest phase of capitalist development. (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1910/1981), pp.234-5, 289. 
19  Lenin, Imperialism,p.28. 
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peasant revolts in general during this period.20 In periods of expansion however, the result of this 
system was a ‘superabundance of capital’21 (otherwise termed overaccumulation), which required 
the export of capital to manage and regulate-this latter effect constituted the main feature of 
modern imperialism, and was what in Lenin’s eyes most distinguished it from its ‘classical’ 
predecessors (which were orientated more around the export of both people-convicts, colonists, and 
slaves- and commodities).22 Given the close coincidence of their views, Hilferding’s main errors in 
Lenin’s view (again according to his private notes), ones which he sought to correct in his own work, 
remained his ‘ignoring the correspondence of finance capital with parasitism’, his ‘(nearly) ignoring 
the division of the world’, his ‘theoretical mistakes regarding money’, and his ‘ignoring the 
correspondence of imperialism with opportunism’.23   
Parasitism and political opportunism were correspondingly emphasized in Lenin's own 1916 
text as the ultimate consequence of uneven development and monopoly capitalism -parasitism here 
being embodied and characterized as the artificial rigging of prices, the induction of stagnation and 
decay as a tendency, via monopolies ring-fencing patents on new technological innovations, the 
generation of a class of shareholders ‘whose profession is idleness’, the increased immigration of 
lower-paid labour (what today would be referred to the international arbitrage of labour), the growth 
of opportunism (as well as social chauvinism) in the more advanced sections of the working class 
movement in response, and the conversion of formerly cultivated land into the private playgrounds 
of the rich. Here, in Lenin’s view, was where Hobson’s 1902 text actually offered more insights than 
Hilferding, not least in his (and others’) warnings that Europe in general risked, via imperialism, 
eventual conversion into a gigantic rentier state.24 The ultimate result of imperialism for those 
countries most actively engaged in the system was correspondingly 'reaction all along the line, 
whatever the political system, and an extreme intensification of antagonisms in this domain also.'25  
Beyond emphasizing parasitism however, Lenin, like Hilferding, also embraced the 
emergence of monopoly capital as simplifying the transition to socialism; so extensive did 
socialization of the means of production now appear to have become in Lenin's eyes, that private 
economic relations and private property had become 'a shell which is no longer suitable for its 
contents...a shell which may continue in a state of decay (particularly if the cure of the opportunist 
abscess is protracted), but which will inevitably be removed.'26 Looking back over the subsequent 
                                                          
20 On this aspect, albeit from a critical perspective, see for example: Esther Kingston-Mann, Lenin and the 
Problem of Marxist Peasant Revolution. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
21 Lenin, Imperialism, p.62. 
22  Ibid. 
23 Lenin, ‘K voprosu ob imperializme.’ Leninskii Sbornik XXII, p.335. 
24 Lenin, Imperialism, pp.100- 5. 
25  Ibid., p.120. 
26  Ibid., p.127. 
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course of the twentieth century, and the collapse of the Soviet experiment, we can only conclude 
that Lenin here was, at best, tragically over-optimistic. His belief in particular during 1917-18, clearly 
inherited from this 1916 analysis, that socialism in Russia was within reach simply through placing 
the capitalist tools of 'accounting and control' in the hands of all the workers themselves, resembled 
at one level a continuation of Hilferding's own final utopian prognostication- that the transition to 
socialism might be very largely facilitated simply by 'taking possession of six large Berlin banks.'27  
Lenin and Bukharin 
If reading Lenin’s notes on Hilferding and Luxemburg reveals fairly clearly what Lenin himself 
felt his text could add in terms of clarification to the Marxist debate on imperialism, tracing the 
similarities and differences between his work and Bukharin’s offers a more ambiguous and narrower 
task, not least since Lenin and Bukharin both openly acknowledged Hilferding's text as their mutual 
starting point. Tony Cliff in fact opined in 1976 that Lenin's treatment of imperialism was derivative of 
Bukharin's-'that, in terms of the actual description of modern capitalism, Lenin is not original at all, 
and borrows practically everything from Bukharin.'28 On one level, Bukharin’s text was arguably the 
more thorough book, insofar as it offered a careful statistical itemisation of both the explosive 
growth in international trade occurring at the time, and the sheer scale and pace of technological 
modernization also taking place. Nonetheless there is also little difficulty in noting that Bukharin's 
was the more mechanistic account, expounded in a unilinear, teleological manner that Lenin would 
ultimately react strongly against. Rather than emphasizing the dialectical antagonisms of uneven 
development, the text occasionally slips into Darwinian, organic metaphors, in which, ‘…like all living 
forms, ‘national economy’ was, and is, engaged in a continuous process of internal regeneration’.29 
All parts of monopoly capitalism were engaged in ‘growing together’ in a manner that created a 
strong tendency towards the eventual emergence of ‘one gigantic combined enterprise under the 
tutelage of the financial kings and the capitalist state.’30  
Given the natural, ‘organic’ nature of this process, what, one might ask, was to prevent the 
emergence of Hilferding’s hypothesis of ‘organized capitalism’, or even Kautsky’s ‘ultra-imperialism’-
                                                          
27  Hilferding however had also argued that this step would at one bound remove the need to expropriate 'the 
great bulk of peasant farms and small industry', since finance capital itself dispensed with the need of 'a 
sudden act of expropriation by the state'. Neither Stalin, Lenin, nor the 'Lefts' in Lenin's own party between 
1917 and 1929 appear to have shared this view. Hilferding, Finance Capital, p.368. Evidence of Lenin's early, 
'optimistic' account of the growing simplicity of managing the transition from capitalism to socialism can be 
found in his 1917-18 texts: 'The State and Revolution', Collected Works 25 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1964), pp. 381-492,'The Crisis has Matured.' Collected Works 26 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 
pp.74-85, and 'The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government.' Collected Works 27 (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1972), pp.235-77. 
28 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, p.8. 
29 Ibid.,p.65. 
30 Ibid., pp.74-5. 
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the Keynesian dream of demand management ultimately eliminating crisis from the capitalist system 
altogether? Here Bukharin offered some ultimately unpersuasive counter-arguments, based largely 
upon the balance of probability-that, when one considered the ‘concrete possibility’ of a world trust, 
of ultra-imperialism, the inability to arrive at a ‘stable compact’, the lack of equilibrium and differing 
nature of individual state trusts, rendered war the more likely actual outcome. Tensions between 
national agendas and the international nature of the cartels themselves were held up as a further 
contradiction that would also produce ‘stubborn struggles’. 31 Missing from Bukharin’s description 
however was the deeper emphasis upon dialectics which Lenin was working on in his Philosophical 
Notebooks at the same time that Imperialism was being written-the notion that the identification of 
opposites is ‘the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies 
in all phenomena…’ 
 In Bukharin’s exposition, by contrast, the impression was conveyed that the move towards 
monopoly occurred everywhere at approximately the same speed and in the same way-to the extent 
that one could make the generalization that ‘…government is de facto transformed into a 
‘committee’ elected by the representatives of entrepreneurs organisations, and it becomes the 
highest guiding force of the state capitalist trust.’32 Intra-capitalist conflict at the national level was 
disappearing; what remained was merely the conflict over dividing the world between these state 
capitalist trusts. By contrast Lenin in his own text emphasized, as we have seen, the heightened 
contradictions between industry and agriculture already generated by finance capital even at the 
national level, and in 1919 he openly disagreed with such a ‘‘bookish’ description of finance 
capitalism’ since ‘…[p]ure imperialism, without the fundamental basis of capitalism, has never 
existed, does not exist anywhere, and never will exist. This is an incorrect generalization of 
everything that was said of the syndicates, cartels, trusts and finance capitalism, where finance 
capitalism was depicted as though it had none of the foundations of the old capitalism under it.’33 
The coexistence of monopoly with free competition at the national level, in short the continuing 
existence of conflicting economic tendencies, of both old and new, in every country on Earth, each to 
its own unique and specific degree, were what in Lenin’s view by contrast rendered both war and 
capitalist crisis inevitable. When contemplating the transition from capitalism to socialism, Bukharin 
was therefore inclined even more than Lenin to foresee this as being a simple process of 
transforming one already-evolved state form into its opposite, via basic administrative steps. 
Accordingly, whilst Lenin after 1918 was increasingly drawn towards acknowledging the complex 
character of the Soviet Union as a workers’ state ‘with a bureaucratic twist’, Bukharin by contrast 
retained a tendency already visible in his own earlier work on imperialism in seeing the final 
evolution from capitalism to socialism as eradicating such political, social and economic 
contradictions altogether. 34 
 
                                                          
31 Ibid., pp.146-9. 
32 Ibid., p.135 
33 Richard B. Day, ‘Dialectical Method in the Political Writings of Lenin and Bukharin.’ Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 9:2 (1976) pp.248-9. 
34 Ibid., pp.250-1. 
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The ‘problems’ with Lenin’s text: content and relevance. 
Reviewing Lenin’s famous text in context reveals both its relative originality, despite the 
often-made charge of its derivative nature, and also raises the question by proxy of how far it 
remains relevant. How does imperialism operate today, and how far can it be factored into the 
nature of capitalism’s latest crisis? Given that free trade rather than protectionism has become, and 
remains- for the moment at least- the cri de coeur of the global capitalist class, to what extent has 
analysis of earlier forms of imperialism, based on rising tariffs and heightened martial competition, 
simply become irrelevant? Here of course an obvious starting point can be made on the three most 
commonly perceived ‘problems’ with Lenin’s text-that it fails to establish linkages between its famous 
five-point definition of imperialism as a ‘special stage’ of capitalism, that it adopted a confused 
mixture of Hilferding and Hobson’s approaches to crisis, which blended disproportionality with 
under-consumptionism as an explanatory discourse, ignoring the ‘true’ Marxist insight over the 
centrality of the falling rate of profit, and- finally- that it was fundamentally wrong about the export 
of capital as the defining characteristic of imperialism.  
Given their interconnection, it will make sense to address the first and last points together. 
Lenin’s text concludes with a five point summation of the ‘essential features’ defining imperialism 
which has aroused criticism and debate ever since: 
1) The concentration of production and capital developed to such a high stage that it 
created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life 
2) The merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this 
“finance capital” of a financial oligarchy 
3) The export of capital, which has become extremely important, as distinguished from the 
export of commodities 
4) The formation of international capitalist monopolies which share the world among 
themselves 
5) The territorial division of the whole world amongst the greatest capital powers is 
completed.35 
Each of these points has proven controversial, but so also has the fact that Lenin fails to decisively 
establish their inter-linkages. Though Lenin himself took care to qualify that any such list would 
remain ‘inadequate’ given ‘the conditional and relative value of all definitions’, the list has since 
become the source of over forty years of constant criticism. That different imperial centres pursue 
different structural models of accumulation-that Germany in Lenin’s day was in reality as different 
from Britain, as Britain also was from the United States-is merely the first, and most obvious, 
reservation to be expressed about point one in Lenin’s list.36 That the views of the capitalist 
investment class and those who govern and manage the state will not necessarily always converge or 
                                                          
35 Lenin, Imperialism, p.89. 
36 Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy, pp.69-70, 148, Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, 
p.117 
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coincide clearly forms a further central point of tension, though, as we have seen above, the 
weakness is more striking in Bukharin’s work than it is in Lenin’s. The fact that the list then does not 
establish a credible link between the growth of monopoly in points 1 & 2 and the export of capital to 
the colonies-the ‘division of the whole world’ stated in points 4 & 5- formed part of the critique of 
Michael Kidron in the 1960s (who at the time pointed to the relative favouring of developed, high-
income countries over less developed ones for capitalist investment), and was returned to again by 
Charles Lindsey in the 1980s (who underlined that crises under capitalism did not depend upon 
monopoly).  
These criticisms of course remain relevant, although they are to a degree themselves one-
sided, and serve more than anything else perhaps to underline the degree of weight necessary to 
reading Lenin’s text as a series of postulates rather than proven facts.  Certainly the export of capital 
came to favour developed over underdeveloped countries to an ever greater degree after the Second 
World War than before-but Lenin himself had also previously noted, in the very text being criticised, 
the preference of French and German capital for investing in Europe and America.37 Lenin’s own text 
therefore does not make the error often attributed to it of assuming a ‘one size fits all’ model, but it 
does leave under-developed-quite deliberately-the political implications of these differences. Kidron 
argued that Lenin’s view of capital flows was one of a process that shunned developed countries and 
rushed to backward ones; this was however something of a straw man argument, since Lenin’s own 
text does not actually claim this, being quite explicit instead that the vast majority of foreign capital 
was invested in Europe and America.38  Though it was to some extent inevitably hijacked and 
interpolated by others into the debate over the Third World and ‘underdevelopment’ of the 1960s 
and 1970s, Lenin’s text is therefore not primarily making an argument about the exploitation of the 
global ‘south’ by the ‘north’; it is rather pointing to the radical multipolarity of imperialism, whose 
distinguishing feature in his own day he argued was ‘…precisely that it strives to annex not only 
agrarian territories, but even the most highly industrialised regions’. 39 This is where Lenin’s text 
differs radically from Hobson’s concerns, and this is also the area that allows it to retain relevance as 
a ‘modern’ text, applicable (as we shall see) to an era of rising and declining powers whose particular 
spatial location is no longer overwhelmingly relevant. 
If the problem of the inter-linkages in Lenin’s text certainly exist (and in fact promote a 
healthy debate), the issue of Lenin as an under-consumptionist theorist has enjoyed a longevity that 
far exceeds the actual evidence available in the text itself. The argument that Lenin’s theory of crisis 
in this work embraced a variant of under-consumptionism boils down to a single passage, wherein 
Lenin states that: 
‘The necessity of exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries 
capitalism has become ‘over-ripe’ and (owing to the backward stage of 
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38 A glance at the table provided by Lenin on page 64 of his work underlines this. Even granting that Lenin 
potentially exaggerates here the distribution of foreign capital with regard to Asia, Africa and Australia, the 
division remains 96 billion marks for Europe and America and 44 billion for Asia, Africa and Australia.  
39 Lenin, Imperialism, p.91 
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agriculture and the impoverished state of the masses) capital cannot find a 
field for ‘profitable’ investment’.40 
At first glance this argument does indeed look like a recasting of Luxemburg’s earlier argument, and 
could mislead the reader into placing Lenin within the ‘underconsumptionist’ school. However 
Lenin’s own phrasing-that this is the case in ‘a few’ countries, and that the backward state of 
agriculture poses a further, and specific, problem- highlights what is in fact the essence of this thesis-
uneven development. As Lenin notes in his conclusions, the general problem is not growth, for: 
 ‘It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the 
 possibility of the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of 
 imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie 
 and certain countries betray, to a more or less degree, one or other of 
 these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than 
 before. But this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general;  
its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries 
 which are richest in capital..[Emphasis added]’41 
Though the modern day reader may struggle to relate to some of Lenin’s own examples of 
decay and parasitism, there is no question that Lenin’s insight into the capacity of capitalism to 
cannibalize itself-the paradox of both decay and overabundance of capital-continues to speak to 
some important modern characteristics of the same phenomenon. The capacity of capitalism for 
colossal waste and disproportionality-the offshoring by already rich states of heavy industry to areas 
with cheaper labour costs, even at the cost of losing guaranteed tax income, or the colossal visible 
decay of former industrial zones like Detroit into areas of catastrophic poverty and desolation, speaks 
to the ongoing capacity of capitalism for multipolar uneven development. It is within this context 
that Lenin’s reference to ‘the impoverished state of the masses’ must be seen, rather than to an 
underconsumptionist argument that capitalism always and everywhere ends up becoming crippled 
by a lack of effective demand. 
 Lenin’s own belief that backward agriculture formed a particular source of disproportionality 
also looked (in his own day) well founded. Throughout the late nineteenth and early part of the 
twentieth century, the relative low productivity and high risk of agriculture haunted the vast majority 
of capitalist economies, whilst the competition of cheap grains from the New World drove down 
grain prices everywhere, placing European farmers periodically in particular difficulties. Britain for 
example addressed the dilemma of feeding itself whilst under German blockade during the Second 
World War via extensive rather than intensive development, and field yields in practice remained 
                                                          
40 Ibid., p.63. 
41 Ibid., p.125 
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static, leading farmers to fear a return to a hand-to-mouth existence once the war was over. This 
reflected the fact that mechanization remained sporadic, and the scientific development of 
treatments to increase crop yields (via both the greater use of chemical fertilisers and gene splicing) 
remained in its infancy until after 1945. Only protectionism, combined with technological innovations 
by mid-century (the so-called ‘Green Revolution’) stemmed this growing pressure on European and 
(increasingly) Asian farmers. Perhaps more surprisingly however, the financial crisis of 2007-08 also 
appears set to cause the ‘Agrarian Question’ to make a comeback in understanding the paradoxes of 
contemporary capitalism, for reasons that I will explore below. 
 Finally, placing Lenin’s Imperialism within the ‘disproportionality’ school exposes what some 
have since criticized as a ‘gap’ in Classical Era Marxism in general-the fact that neither Lenin nor 
many other Marxists of that era went to great effort to integrate Marx’s ‘falling rate of profit’ thesis 
from volume 3 of Capital into their own analyses. This is certainly true, but one can also speculate 
that they did so due to encountering many of the same problems that continue to hamper 
development of this debate even today-namely, the shortage of accurate statistics on the global rate 
of profit, question marks over the centrality of the thesis to Marx’s final arguments in general, and 
the fact that crises themselves represent both the ultimate countervailing tendency to the falling rate 
of profit , and do tend to practically manifest themselves in the explosion of previously growing 
forms of unseen disproportionality (such as the oil price shock of 1973 or the collapse of credit based 
securities in the US in 2007-08). From the point of view of clarity to the ordinary layman therefore, 
Lenin and Hilferding’s analyses could in fact be praised as much as criticized, in so far as they do no 
more than attempt to describe and integrate phenomena which are unquestionably visible. 
Lenin’s Imperialism today: still relevant 
Though it would be foolish to claim that Lenin’s text is flawless, the process of rescuing the 
original writing from some (at least) of its more vehement critics also allows a fresh look to be taken 
at its contemporary relevance, particularly once removed from a 1960s-70s era ‘north-south’ debate 
over underdevelopment to which it never belonged. In terms of analysing imperialism today against 
Lenin’s parameters, I shall now focus on three further aspects of Lenin’s text which have arguably 
emerged with, if anything, even greater force since the financial crash of 2007. The first is the 
question of uneven development and the geopolitical competition that such processes generate, 
viewed through the prism of the current crisis in the Ukraine. The second is the question of the 
international arms race, which both Kautsky’s ‘ultra-imperialism’ or Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ 
thesis predicted would become irrelevant, but which has been both sustained (though at a lower 
tempo) since 1991, and also fed in a fairly specific way into the current Eurozone financial crisis. The 
third is the revival, against all expectation, of the ‘agrarian question,’ and the financialization of 
agricultural land, which appears set to undermine many of the original assumptions that might make 
one assume Lenin’s text was merely ‘of its time’, and now entirely outdated. 
With regard to the Ukraine, the very real geopolitics of this conflict however has, to date, 
rendered difficult an actual dissection of the economic interests involved. The difficulty of ascribing 
direct links between economic blocs and the political actions being taken in fact had already led 
Lenin in his own work in 1916 (although undoubtedly also due to his consciousness of the censor) to 
comment that ‘I shall not be able to deal with the non-economic aspects of the question [politics], 
13 
however much they deserve to be dealt with.’42 There is no need not to believe that other factors, 
such as national chauvinism, individual ego, historical narratives, cultural biases and perceived vital 
interests (such as military bases) influence political decision makers as well. What remains essential 
to a Marxist analysis however is that, no matter how unfashionable the base-superstructure 
argument in some circles may be today, links between economics and politics do also exist, operate, 
and often even still predominate. It is clear that heavy economic and political pressure is currently 
being used by Russia, the EU and US to effectively territorially re-divide the Ukraine. Active 
participants in this process as well though are the Ukrainian oligarchs themselves, two of whom were 
recently parachuted in by the new government in Kiev to serve as governors in Ukraine’s eastern 
provinces, whilst the defection of two others from the Party of Regions proved critical to 
Yanukovich’s own downfall.43 15 leading Ukrainian oligarchs, together with the so-called ‘family’ 
around the recently ousted President Yanukovich, collectively constitute 0.00003 percent of Ukraine’s 
population of 46 million people, but between them they also control an estimated 80-85 percent of 
the country’s entire GDP.44 One of the most publically visible Ukrainian oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov, is 
listed by Forbes as the 46th wealthiest man in the world. His assets were estimated at between $16 
and $26 billion USD in 2011. These oligarchs are also extensively transnationally networked, 
funnelling profits made abroad through offshore shell intermediary subsidiaries scattered across 
Switzerland, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the British 
Virgin Islands. Such networking of course also extends to political and social contacts, with Ukraine’s 
best-known oligarch, Viktor Pinchuk, personally worth $3.2 billion, funding ex-UK PM Tony Blair’s 
Faith Foundation.  
There remains however the need to concretely analyse how this vast and highly uneven 
concentration of capital came about. It did not occur, as in classic political economy, via intra-sectoral 
competition and the demands of expanded reproduction; it came about as part of the legacy of 
Stalinism in Eastern Europe, and the looting of that Stalinist-style economy by its own bureaucrats, 
who overnight became capitalists. The concrete specifics of the Ukrainian situation, like that of 
Russia, therefore remains that large sections of the industrial economy remain unreformed and 
inefficient, with the consequent dynamic that the oligarchs themselves frequently appear to be 
                                                          
42 Lenin, Imperialism. p.15. 
43 The two defections were those of Rinat Akhmetov and Dmitry Firtash: Christian Neef, ‘Yanukovych’s 
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acting according to the credo of Lampedusa’s famous Sicilian Prince, that ‘everything must change so 
that everything can stay the same.’ Clearly the current Ukrainian unrest, however undeniably sparked 
by both real local discontents, and by more extreme and radical currents like Svoboda or the Right 
Sector, is also therefore being shaped and guided by competing poles of external and internal finance 
capital, with the goal in reality perhaps being to convert Ukraine more closely towards meeting 
Lenin’s definition of a semi-colony. Lenin in this sense has also certainly proved more prophetic than 
Kautsky, whose notion of the cartelization of ‘Ultra-Imperialism’ negating all differences between 
such competing poles of capital predated Francis Fukuyama’s later but equally utopian ‘End of 
History’ thesis by over 70 years. 
 Relevant and topical as this case study may be however, two wider trends beyond the 
Ukraine example itself exist which may yet come to prove critical to understanding and tracking the 
development of imperialism in the twenty-first century. The first is the ongoing drive for greater and 
greater securitization of all spheres, which raises the question more generally as to whether 
capitalism has to manufacture a ‘security race’ (I use this term since an ‘arms race’ no longer seems 
entirely appropriate, given the parallel expansion of non-military assets such as police surveillance), 
even when there is no obvious actual military or political threat suggesting a burning need for such 
an endeavour. The second is the so-called ‘landgrabbing’ phenomenon tied to the ‘new agrarian 
question’, with capital markets since 2007 having acquired a new interest in agricultural land as a 
portfolio investment, a phenomena driven by the growing power of the global corporate food 
regime. These two trends are potentially also interlinked of course, with the securitization of 
farmland being the next natural step to its growing financialization. Both trends can also be linked 
with Marxist theories of crisis, namely the systemic problem of capitalist overaccumulation, and the 
need to find ever more inventive ways for expanded reproduction. Both trends also contain elements 
of classical imperialism, but in a now yet further transformed form, in which private security firms or 
even out-and-out mercenaries stand in for or supplement traditional national armies, whilst the 
object of territorial annexation itself becomes the fencing-off (and extraction) of the land’s natural 
bio-wealth as well as its traditional mineral resources from other competitors.  
In regard to the arms race, Lenin noted in 1916 that one of the peculiarities of monopoly 
finance capital and imperialism lay in the capacity to exert extra pressure: 
‘The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan that is granted shall 
be spent on purchases in the country of issue, particularly on orders for war 
materials, or for ships, etc.’45 
During the most recent Euro crisis this phenomenon found itself replayed with eerie 
accuracy, with many of the states in biggest trouble financially also being those with the highest 
expenditures on weapons acquisition from other EU states, despite repeated NATO alarmism about a 
general reduction in defence expenditures. As Frank Slijper most recently detailed in April 2013, EU 
military expenditure in 2010 still totalled 194 billion euros, equivalent to the annual deficits of 
Greece, Italy and Spain combined. Greece itself was Europe’s biggest spender on weapons 
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procurement in relative terms, whilst Spain’s military expenditure increased 29 percent between 
2000 and 2008, much of it on weapons which Spanish politicians themselves recognized Spain would 
not require, and would never employ.46 Even Italy, facing debts of €1.8 trillion, still spends a higher 
proportion of its GDP on military expenditure than the post-Cold War low of 1995. Where pressure 
to enact cuts have been exerted in this context, they have also fallen on military personnel rather 
than equipment, and Greece in fact has at the same time come under heavy pressure to honour 
export licences on military equipment with the Netherlands worth 53 million euros, and similar 
contracts with Germany for submarines, ships and tanks worth billions of euros.47  
 In terms of throwing capital into circulation which otherwise would not find a home, as well 
as continually redistributing debt, the global arms trade therefore remains an important safety valve 
for capitalism, even when (in the case of America) it has also clearly run out of control, contributing 
to a current US national debt running at 104 percent of national GDP (currently $17 trillion).48 The 
post-2001 security environment has thus in many ways still been a Godsend for a system which faced 
real cutbacks at the end of the Cold War, even whilst unsustainable expenditures by individual states 
have still self-evidently not been enough to avert a wider crisis itself. The hundred largest companies 
in the global arms trade sold arms to the value of some €318 billion in 2011, 51 percent higher in real 
terms compared to 2002. Bribes paid to grease the wheels of such arms contracts meanwhile are 
thought in some accounts to amount to $2.5 billion annually.49 The increasing securitization of 
individual states has also become a requirement for states seeking accession to the EU, with Turkey, 
kept on the doorstep of Europe for over thirty years, having recently undergone an extensive 
institutional realignment of power along these lines. The ruling AKP party (since 2003) has taken 
dramatic steps to increase cooperation against drug trafficking with both other EU member states 
(particularly Germany and the UK) and with downstream states such as Afghanistan, Somalia and the 
Central Asian states. This at one level serves to attract greater EU and American investment, which 
has led to reform and expansion of Turkey’s police in particular-over 90,000 new police officers have 
been hired in Turkey since 2002, making it in some accounts the second most heavily policed country 
in the world per capita after Russia. At another level however it has also introduced destabilising new 
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political dynamics into Turkey itself, with wiretapping of innocent civilians a growing domestic 
scandal, and the army, the traditional guardian of Turkey’s secular tradition, politically emasculated 
by high profile police investigations into alleged anti-government conspiracies by active and retired 
members of the military’s own officer corps. 
Whilst the arms trade remains a vibrant aspect of capitalism’s current contradictions in a 
manner that Lenin would no doubt still recognize, global land-grabbing represents a new area in 
terms of both exporting capital, creating new financial portfolios, and again physically re-dividing the 
world. Given the role of spikes in world food prices in many of the recent episodes of unrest in the 
so-called ‘Arab Spring’, this will clearly be an emerging trend which students of twenty-first century 
capitalism will need to continue to watch closely to attempt to understand. In the 2006-2008 period, 
average world prices for rice rose by 217 percent, wheat by 136 percent, maize by 125 percent and 
soybeans by 107 percent. But by the end of 2008, prices fell just as dramatically as financial markets 
collapsed and investors retreated.50 The growing financialization of every aspect of the food 
production chain clearly offers both the opportunity for even deeper leverage by the major 
concentrations of global finance capital, and the possibility of further and deeper contradictions and 
disproportionalities, comparable to the collateralized debt obligations which exploded and 
unravelled around the US property market in 2007-8.  
This situation is brought about by the fact that commodity index funds are now in fact 
already derivatives sold by most major banks, offering investors an opportunity to gain exposure to 
commodity markets without being required to purchase the actual commodities themselves on the 
relevant exchanges. Since the 1980s, selling these products has correspondingly compelled banks to 
invest more in actual commodity futures as a hedge against commodity prices rising, and investors 
correspondingly having to be paid a larger rate of return. With the rise as well of new markets such 
as biofuels, large scale land investments, in order to maximize possible rates of return, have 
accordingly followed on high value crops such as maize, palm oil, soybean and sugarcane, with these 
becoming a steadily more important aspect of the financial portfolios of leading banks and pension 
funds. This has in turn led to relatively large land acquisitions, with the World Bank recording 
announcements on over 46 million ha in large-scale farmland acquisitions or negotiations between 
October 2008 and August 2009 alone, with two-thirds of the demanded land concentrated in Sub-
Saharan Africa.51 The separation between use value and exchange value here (or as one recent 
review put it, the duality of a ‘productive asset that moonlights as a financial asset’)52 both 
corresponds to Marx’s paradigm of the law of value in general, and offers echoes on Lenin’s own 
prognosis that finance capital increases the disproportionalities between agriculture and industry. In 
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this, as well as in the other ways outlined above, Lenin’s imperialism therefore remains relevant to 
attempts to interpret the ongoing and still evolving shape and nature of imperialism in the twenty-
first century. 
 
 
 
 
 
